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ABSTRACT
Health policy in Europe is at a crossroads. Longstanding challenges, such as 
persisting social and geographical inequalities, ageing populations, and rising 
burdens of chronic diseases, are being compounded by new, global threats, such 
as  pandemic infl uenza and crises in the world’s fi nancial markets. Signifi cant 
improvement in the health of Europe’s population has been driven by factors both 
inside and outside the health sector. Key obstacles to improving population health 
in Europe result from underlying failures to overcome political and economic 
issues, including those shaping healthcare fi nancing and delivery systems. How can 
the public health community respond to these challenges? This paper discusses 
three examples of how power and politics have shaped the world in which public 
health works. The focus on individual risk factors diverts attention from underlying 
determinants, such as the dominance of the market in healthcare, and the political 
decision to favour a rapid transition from communism in the 1990s. Effective public 
health policy requires addressing these political forces, seeking to understand the 
dominant paradigms, how they have been defi ned and shaped, and how they might 
be changed. Their effects are often subtle but powerful, shaping the language that is 
used, the assumptions that are made, and the rules that are implied. We can formulate 
key policy options to help improve health outcomes by reshaping the critical forces 
that affect public health risk factors among those populations currently most 
burdened by signifi cant disease in Europe today.
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INTRODUCTION
When asked to write a review of health status and challenges in Europe, our 
initial thoughts were: it’s not so bad. Indeed, it seems quite boringly 
peaceful. Health in Europe has improved remarkably over recent decades. 
In the last 50 years, the probability of dying in the fi rst year of life dropped 
from 1 in 20 to less than 1 in 150, while a fi fteen year old’s chance of dying 
before the age of 60 fell from about one-half to one-quarter. Among all age 
groups and both genders, overall mortality rates have fallen by about 
16 percent overall in the region since the 1980s (Figures 1 and 2). Compared 
with low- and middle-income countries, and even many higher-income 
nations in Asia and the Americas, Europeans have achieved impressive 
health gains. European health systems are delivering, for the most part, 
high quality care in a reasonably equitable manner and at a much lower cost 
than that in the United States. Most European countries have managed to 
contain the increase in costs at affordable levels.
Fig. 1. Trends in Probabilities of Death, by Gender, Europe 1956-2006.
Notes: Source of data: WHO Global Mortality Database 2008 edition. Authors’ calculations. Weighted 
average of 15p0, 45p15 and 15p60 for EU countries for which data are available, including Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany (West Germany pre-1989), Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. A great proportion 
of Europe’s largest minority group, the Roma of Central and Eastern Europe, continue to be deprived of 
access to healthcare,7 experiencing much worse health outcomes than any other distinct population in 
Europe.8,9 As Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) began “returning to Europe” following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989,10 the health of its peoples began to converge with their neighbours 
in Western European countries. However, rapid economic reforms in the former Soviet Union, 11 which 
often benefi ted the few at the expense of the many, resulted in over 3 million excess deaths.12 In 2007, 
mortality rates in post-Soviet countries were about 20 percent higher than in 1990 (Figure 2).
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Yet on closer inspection, it is clear that Europe still faces many challenges. 
There is a persisting gradient in health across the socioeconomic spectrum,1,2 
and in some countries inequalities have widened between those in different 
income, educational, and occupational classes.3-6 Adult men continue to 
have an 80 percent higher risk of dying between ages 15 and 60 than do 
women (Figure 1).
Fig. 2. Trends in Age Standardised All-Cause Mortality Rates, Europe 1980-2007.
Notes: Source of Data: WHO European Health for All Database HFA-MDB 2008 edition: Atlas of 
health in Europe second edition. Available from URL: http://www.euro.who.int/Document/E91713.
pdf (Accessed 14 April, 2010).
There is also evidence that the rate of improvement is slowing. 13 
Although increasing affl uence has brought many benefi ts, in particular 
advances in medical care, it has also contributed to changes in lifestyle 
that  now have adverse impact on health. Many of these arise from the 
combination of easy access to cheap energy dense food and environments 
that both encourage the use of motorised transport and discourage physical 
exercise. 14 These changes have been taking place at a time when the once 
high burden of communicable disease has been falling, giving rise to a 
phenomenon termed the “epidemiologic transition”.
These changes are taking place at a time when Europe is ageing rapidly, 
as a consequence of increased longevity and falling birth rates. Hopes that 
the health consequences of ageing might be offset by substantial reductions 
in the time people suffer from ill-health before dying (i.e., the “compression 
of morbidity”) 15 may not be realised.16 The cost of caring for an older, 
sicker population may be considerable, especially given upward pressure 
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on costs from advances in technology, one of the major drivers of healthcare 
expenditure in recent decades. 17 This could pose a challenge to the post-war 
European consensus on social solidarity in a Europe with a greater share of 
retired people and ethnic minorities. The risks are exacerbated by tensions 
being stoked up by ideologically driven politicians and media commentators 
seeking to reduce the size of the state.18 
Some of the newer EU member states face additional challenges. One 
example is tuberculosis, where the greater incidence in Central and Eastern 
Europe (39 per 100,000 population among post-2004 EU members) threatens 
tuberculosis control in regions of Europe in which incidence rates are 
currently low (about 9 per 100,000 population in 2007), especially given 
weaknesses in surveillance in some of the most affected EU Member States. 
More recently, threats from other parts of an increasingly interconnected 
world, such as the “Great Recession” of 2008/2009 i.e., the current global 
economic downturn, and H1N1 infl uenza outbreaks, show how European 
public health is becoming dependent on health outside of Europe. 
Shifting political pressures further complicate the situation. In response 
to the current fi nancial crisis, some governments ideologically committed 
to reducing the role of the state have seized the opportunity to enter an ‘age 
of austerity’ and fi scal prudence, campaigning on platforms of curtailing 
growth in public spending sometimes cutting up to fi fteen percent of their 
health budgets.19,20 Others have been forced, against their will, to make 
similar or greater cuts, with those countries borrowing from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) having been most affected. 21 The IMF has pursued 
policies designed to maintain exchange rates and low infl ation to protect 
international lenders at the expense of citizens and governments in the 
countries affected. 22,23 Rather than implement radical budget cuts of up to 
60 percent called for by the IMF, health ministers in Latvia and Iceland 
chose to resign.24
Thus, we can see that, despite many successes, European public health 
still faces major challenges: stagnating progress and persistent inequalities, 
alongside new health threats arising from interconnected global forces and 
potentially slowing growth in public health budgets. How should Europe’s 
health policy community respond? Most of the remaining challenges are 
soluble with existing knowledge. The failure lies in the economic and 
political context in which public health decisions are made and in which 
new threats to health arise.
The current situation has long historical roots. By the middle of the 
19th  century, Europe was undergoing the major social and economic 
transformations of the Industrial Revolution. Markets were more integrated 
than ever before and by the beginning of the 20th century, international trade 
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was even more important than now, as European countries invested heavily 
in their colonies and throughout the Americas. At the time, there were three 
major approaches to health: the fi rst focussing on the miasma theory with 
its focus on sanitation, followed by the germ theories of disease and 
associated science investigating the biological basis of health and the agents 
causing disease; thirdly, the expanded capacity of healthcare services, 
driven by a combination of scientifi c progress (especially laboratory 
science, imaging, asepsis, and pharmacology, including anaesthesia)21, 25; 
and third, the emergence of epidemiology as a discipline (exemplifi ed by 
the work of John Snow)26 and the development of social medicine 
(exemplifi ed by the work of Rudolf Virchow). The precise contribution of 
all of these developments continues to be debated, but all played a part.21,25, 27 
However, until the 1960s, the greatest health gains came about as 
a  consequence of factors outside the health system, and in particular 
improvements in housing, sanitation, safe water and food supplies, 
improved nutrition, employment, wages, and education, which caused a 
steady improvement in living standards and reduced morbidity, for example 
from tuberculosis.28 
Today we face a similar situation. We have undergone an intellectual 
and economic revolution that has transformed our working lives and habits, 
producing profound inequalities yet interconnecting us more than ever 
before.29,30 Unlike in the past, however, the burden of disease is increasingly 
chronic and human-produced, resulting from lifestyles that are infl uenced 
by changing social and environmental conditions.14 The past century has 
seen great advances in medicine. These include advances in the understanding 
of disease, often leading to the use of important discoveries and successes 
such as Helicobacter eradication to prevent peptic ulcer diseases, the 
development of safe and effective drugs to treat common conditions such 
as hypertension, diabetes and mental disorders, and an ever growing 
number of vaccines, including products that reduce the risk of cancer. 
However, the scale of this success now poses problems for the pharma-
ceutical industry that has led this process. It has developed on the basis of 
a model that is now seen as unsustainable, whereby a progression of high 
revenue “blockbuster” drugs, each costing vast sums of money to develop, 
are offered to patients with common chronic disorders (such as hypertension, 
chronic airway disease, or arthritis). Patients are typically introduced to 
these drugs when they reach middle-age and will continue to consume 
them for the rest of their lives. This model allows the drug companies to sell 
their products at prices that are affordable but suffi cient to recoup their 
investment, as well as a handsome profi t. Put simply, with the exception of 
cognitive decline, there are very few common conditions left for which new 
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treatments are needed. As a consequence, companies have focused on niche 
products, such as treatments for cancer, appropriate for only a small number 
of patients (often reduced even further by improved knowledge of cellular 
characteristics such as receptor status), which will prolong life for perhaps 
a few months. The resulting products must then be sold at prices that many 
healthcare funders view as prohibitive, especially where they achieve 
limited extension of life and little reduction in suffering, often for patients 
of already advanced age, yet at the same time, proven effective measures of 
prevention are left grossly underfunded.15
Public health confronts the same choices about how to respond to the 
new public health challenges in Europe: push for further research in the 
basic sciences to understand more about the aetiology and treatment of 
disease; focus on the expansion of healthcare services where there is 
evidence of inadequate response to need; or reinvigorate efforts to address 
the social determinants of disease. Of course, these options are not mutually 
exclusive and all are needed to some extent. But as in the 19th and early 20th 
century, the fi rst two options have continued to dominate discussion of 
health policy, perhaps because the third seems vague, long-term (almost 
invariably bringing results that extend beyond the electoral cycle), supported 
by inadequate evidence, and confronted by powerful vested interests. 
This imbalance is apparent when contrasting the relatively lukewarm 
response by institutions beyond the traditional public health community to 
the report of the World Health Organization (WHO) Commission on Social 
Determinants of Health 31 while the WHO Commission on Macroeconomics 
and Health was greeted with enthusiastic response. The latter emphasised 
the role of health as a stimulator of economic growth. From this perspective, 
healthcare and public health become instruments of economic gain, 
delivered not through public initiatives but through a market-based set of 
interventions to expand profi ts and fi nancial activity (namely, the World 
Bank’s Health Sector Reform model).32 The Commission on the Social 
Determinants of Health report, on the other hand, argued that social 
inequalities were killing people on a grand scale.31 Rather than focusing 
exclusively on economic growth as a goal, this report indicated that 
inequality-generating policies of bodies such as the IMF were responsible 
for maintaining millions in poverty while a few were able to profi t 
enormously. These policies include promoting public wage-ceilings to 
provide cheaper labour and increase profi ts21,32,33 in support of increasingly 
private forms of investment.22,33,34 Thus, while the scientifi c arguments 
underpinning both reports may be equally valid (although the Commission 
on Macroeconomics and Health has been critiqued by some economists), 35 
the implications for political economy differ considerably. 
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In this paper, we argue that the new public health should in addition 
to  promoting implementation of high standards of prevention methods 
available, should also be strategic, putting power and politics back at the 
centre of public health analysis in a way that can resolve the discrepancy 
highlighted by the difference between the reports of these two commissions. 
Progress on key challenges facing European public health will depend on 
the extent to which the European public health community can engage with 
the political economy of the world it inhabits. It is not enough to deal with 
the immediate causes of ill health; instead public health professionals must 
ask why things are as they are? What are the assumptions underlying how 
we organise society? Who sets the rules, and are they fi t for their purpose? 
After reviewing briefl y the determinants of health in a population, we 
illustrate our arguments with three examples: the individualisation and 
medicalisation of risk factors; the dominance of free market epidemiology 
in health systems; and the political transition in Eastern Europe and the 
persisting East-West health gap. We conclude with recommendations for a 
new public health perspective that would put power and politics at the 
centre of our debates and analyses.
THE DETERMINANTS OF POPULATION HEALTH
The burden of disease in a population refl ects the infl uence of a series of 
interacting factors lying along a causal pathway. One way to conceptualise 
the determinants of health is in terms of immediate, proximal and underlying 
factors (a distance metric), acting at different levels of infl uence (e.g., 
individual, family, community, and population) and carrying varying 
degrees of power (a strength metric). 
A large body of research, both epidemiological and biological, has 
identifi ed the role of various immediate risk factors in the aetiology of 
many individual diseases. These risk factors include genetic and 
environmentally determined physiological factors, such as lipid and blood 
pressure levels. These are in turn infl uenced by proximal factors, sometimes 
referred to as lifestyle factors. Examples of the latter include diet, alcohol 
and tobacco use, and physical activity, as well as biological factors that can, 
to varying degrees, be attributed to the proximal factors (often interacting 
with genetic susceptibility), such as high blood pressure and cholesterol. 
Proximal and immediate risks frequently interact with certain personal 
behaviours, thereby increasing the risk of a variety of diseases acting 
through different biological mechanisms. 
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One example is tobacco use, whereby those who smoke (or inhale 
tobacco smoke from others) are exposed to substances such as nitrosamines, 
which act as carcinogens creating genetic mutations. Concurrently, carbon 
monoxide displaces oxygen from haemoglobin while other components of 
smoke impair endothelial function, increasing the risk of coronary artery 
disease. Yet, knowing these immediate and proximal risks tells us nothing 
about why people smoke (or how to intervene). As many philosophers have 
noted: People make choices but not always in the circumstances of their 
own choosing. Thus, there are also a range of distal factors leading to 
behavioural choices such as tobacco use. Smoking rates are strongly 
socially patterned, at present concentrated among the poor and the least 
well educated in rich countries and among young urban dwellers in poor 
countries. These patterns refl ect the interplay of a wide range of distal 
factors acting at both individual and societal levels, including social norms, 
health beliefs, economic and employment circumstances, and marketing by 
tobacco companies. Overall, however, the immediate and proximal risk 
factors can account for a large fraction of the burden of disease, in part, 
because they refl ect the social conditions in which people live.
One determinant of population health that has previously received 
rather less attention is healthcare. Historically there has been considerable 
scepticism about its contribution to population health in Europe. Writing in 
the 1960s, McKeown argued that most of the improvements in mortality 
over the previous century and a half had preceded the introduction of 
effective medical care and were instead due to improved living conditions, 
in particular nutrition.27 In the 1970s, Cochrane and colleagues attempted 
to evaluate the impact of health spending on health outcomes, fi nding little 
or no effect of medical care on mortality rates across countries.36 There is 
considerable historical evidence that the major declines in infectious 
diseases predated the development of effective medicines and were instead 
due to a combination of improved living conditions and public health 
measures such as improved sanitation, food safety and immunization. It 
was only in the late 1940s and 1950s that effective and safe drugs became 
available to prolong life for those suffering from many common diseases. 
Initially antibiotics, followed by a growing list of treatments for common 
non-communicable diseases (NCDs), such as hypertension and chronic 
obstructive airways disease, as well as others that, while less obviously 
life  saving, greatly improved quality of life, such as non-steroidal anti-
infl ammatory drugs for arthritis and neuroleptics and antidepressants for 
severe mental illness. At the same time, the development of new and safe 
vaccines greatly reduced the risk of a number of potentially life-threatening 
or disabling diseases, such as measles and polio.
Consequently, it was only from the mid-1960s onward that healthcare 
really began to make a difference to overall mortality rates, a phenomenon 
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observable from a comparison of the United Kingdom, where modern 
healthcare was being introduced, and the Soviet Union, where it was not.37 
By the 198 0s, it became possible to estimate its actual contribution to 
mortality, using the new concept of avoidable mortality (that is, mortality 
that should not occur in the presence of timely and effective healthcare). 
Conceived in the US, it identifi ed that portion of mortality that should be 
amenable to medical intervention.38 This was subsequently adapted by 
researchers in Europe39,40 and is now used widely in comparisons of healthcare 
performance.41,42 Deaths fro m these causes have fallen markedly in recent 
decades in European countries, to a substantially greater degree than other 
causes of death, and much faster than in the US.42 Consequently, they now 
account for only between 7 and 10 percent of all deaths across Europe.40
Nonetheless, considerable variations remain in mortality amenable to 
medical care and, in general, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 
and especially the countries of the former Soviet Union, still lag far behind. 
However, the implication is that while future developments in personal care 
may be able to contribute more to the relief of disability, the scope of 
contribution to longevity, in the absence of some major unanticipated 
breakthrough, is likely to be limited and the main challenge must be to 
ensure that those who can benefi t from existing knowledge are able to do 
so. Fortunately, Europe provides a rich natural laboratory to learn from 
its  diverse national and regional experiences, as different countries with 
varied institutions and cultures adopt alternative angles to address similar 
challenges, resulting in differing health outcomes. This makes it possible to 
catalogue both successes and failures, so determining what should be 
replicated or abandoned,43 a task facilitated by the European research 
community (in particular schools of public health) and bodies such as the 
European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies. 
RESPONSES TO CURRENT AND EMERGING PUBLIC HEALTH 
RISKS
In Search of Common Risks: Individualising Public Health
How has the public health community responded to the changing nature of 
European public health risks? 
European public health researchers have undertaken countless studies 
on common proximal risk factors and diagnoses, both individually and in 
combination: obesity and breast cancer; obesity and diabetes; tobacco and 
diabetes; diabetes and heart disease. But how much has this body of 
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knowledge been applied in public health practice and contributed to the 
improvement of public health?
Given the current state of knowledge, the potential payoff from this 
research may be limited. Rarely does it go from description to explanation, 
let alone the identifi cation of effective interventions. Crucial issues 
pertaining to the political economy of how decisions are made and how 
new policies can be developed are rarely even considered. 
The case of tobacco control puts the problem in perspective. In the 
1950s, Doll and Hill demonstrated the link between lung cancer and 
smoking.44 Little further action was taken in Europe. In 1964, the US 
Surgeon General’s report on smoking put the issue at the forefront of public 
health discussions.45 Debates continued through the 1960s and 1970s in the 
scientifi c literature, confounded by spurious scientifi c fi ndings produced by 
tobacco companies and pseudo-scientifi c industry front-groups. During 
this period, little action was taken regarding tobacco control, even though 
smoking rates among women, who in many countries had previously 
smoked only rarely, were increasing rapidly. Concerted action by govern-
ments to tackle the industry, under strong pressure and infl uence of 
community based advocacy groups and court decisions, was the only factor 
that made a difference. This led to legislating for warning labels on cigarette 
packs, bans on smoking in public places, increased taxation, and measures 
to combat smuggling (in which the leading tobacco companies were often 
complicit).46,47 In a few cases they went even further, as when the Minnesota 
Attorney General initiated litigation against the industry, leading to the 
disclosure of millions of their internal documents, casting light on the 
tactics they had been using to subvert evidence and policies. Thus, tobacco 
consumption has only dropped substantially more than thirty years after 
the initial research showed it to cause lung cancer. The toll of decades of 
inaction, including failure to effectively tackle the tobacco industry, 
includes millions of excess deaths that even now continue to grow as the 
tobacco industry expands into emerging markets in Africa and Asia. 
Today, similar debates are occurring in relation to nutrition (a key factor 
associated with the rising prevalence of NCDs. Yet the risks associated with 
food consumption are even more challenging because the products are not 
incontestably ‘global bads’ like tobacco, which had just a few clearly 
identifi able producers and no benefi ts. Even the worst nutritional products, 
such as carbonated drinks, can be presented as being tolerable in moderation, 
frustrating efforts such as taxation or community bans. Scientifi c consensus 
was a precursor for progress in tobacco, but public health is nowhere near 
this stage with nutrition, given myriad exposures and outcomes as well as 
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furious debates between different theorizers about, for example, the optimal 
strategy for weight loss. 
What can the concerned health policy community do about the latest 
challenges to confront it? More fundamentally, what has happened to the 
fi eld of public health that it appears so impotent in the face of such an 
overarching population risk? At least three factors appear to have weakened 
public health’s infl uence on public policy. First, scepticism about the 
scientifi c validity of population-level analysis began to emerge in the 
1930s. This dates to Robinson’s seminal paper on illiteracy and black 
ethnicity in the US,48 Durkheim’s preceding work on suicide,49 and Selvin’s 
coining of the term “ecologic fallacy” in the 1950s – methodological 
concerns that subsequently fi lled epidemiology textbooks.50 Not just public 
health, but most of the social sciences were driven to focus on individual-
level analysis.48 This approach to understanding society, putting primacy on 
the individual’s experience,51 was most c learly enshrined in economics, in 
the form of methodological individualism. 
At the same time, public health lost touch with its analytical roots, 
focusing instead on describing a few risk factors – an orientation that was 
locked-in through the development of surveys and establishment of cohorts. 
One impetus for this development was the seminal Framingham heart study 
in the 1960s, which showed how the risk of a major cardiovascular event 
(heart attack or stroke) could be estimated from knowledge of age, gender, 
and results of a few laboratory tests. Instead of thinking about underlying 
social explanations for those laboratory results, public health analysis came 
to focus on the results themselves as proximal factors for analysis.52,53 
Surveys  an d instruments abounded to quantify these factors, shrinking the 
scope of inquiry for PhD students and researchers to those variables which 
were available from standardised data sets whose mining became the basis 
for academic careers and, in some cases, entire institutes.
As a consequence, the fi eld of public health has shied away from 
analyzing political factors, romanticising the notion of the ‘independent’ 
epidemiologist.51,54 In its ideal form, as a scientist in pursuit of objective 
scientifi c truths, the epidemiologist would free him or herself from outside 
infl uences such as political or economic ideology.55 Nothing could be 
further from the truth, or more dangerous. In economics, Keynes famously 
pointed out that practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt 
from any intellectual infl uence, are usually the slaves of some defunct 
economist. That is where the danger lies. Epidemiologists, neglecting 
whatever unperceived infl uences lie behind their work, are unable to 
mitigate them. Instead, if we account for the intimate relationship between 
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the production and structure of new knowledge and the holding of power,56 
we could identify and make transparent the values behind studies – from 
confl icts of interest to the very nature of the questions being asked – and act 
to prevent them from impinging on the research design, approaches, or 
investigations we consider relevant and interesting. 
While the choice of risk factors may seem value-free, it is not. The 
production of knowledge by epidemiologists interacts powerfully with the 
political environment, affecting power struggles in politics. For example, as 
research focuses on individual-level risk factors, it does so at the expense 
of other explanations, creating a skewed understanding of disease that 
facilitates political decisions that disregard the chains of disease causation 
and the most powerful channels for intervention. In short, implications with 
value-free, apolitical studies do not exist, and the public health community 
should recognise this fact more explicitly in order to improve its scope of 
investigation and effectiveness.*4 
Controlling risks requires thinking about why people are exposed to 
them. In the case of smoking, public health analyses the effects of smoking, 
but less often the reasons that people smoke. To accomplish the latter task, 
a theoretical model is required; the theoretical ‘black-box’ of chronic 
disease epidemiology is inadequate.52,53 Explanations such as “low 
socioeconomic status”, based on correlations, do not suffi ce as explanations; 
they are only descriptions. Attributing behaviour to ‘psycho-social’ stress 
is similarly nebulous (which may explain why it has been so readily 
promulgated by the tobacco industry). Economics offers potential insights 
through rational-addiction models and rates of time-discount; psychology 
and sociology similarly offer theoretical frameworks through which to test 
carefully hypotheses that can lead down a trajectory to effective social 
intervention. However, it has become diffi cult for the public health 
community to engage as an equal in some of the leading contemporary 
debates in economics. Public health analysts that do address these issues, 
such as those relating income inequality to health (referred to by the British 
Medical Journal as a “big idea” in public health)57 tend to be met with 
scepticism by economists, many of whom are dismissive of public health 
research. This is in part because of a perceived failure by the latter to 
employ some of the more sophisticated methodologies for dealing 
* To be clear, we are not arguing for subjectivity in science. Researchers should strive to be 
completely objective, divorcing themselves from ideology, interests, or preferences in the data 
collection and analysis process. However, we can never be politically neutral in our choices 
about what to study.
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with  confounding factors (where insights from econometrics have only 
minimally been integrated into biostatistics texts). As Deaton, in a paper in 
a fl agship economic journal put it euphemistically:
 The literature that is reviewed in this paper comes from a number of 
fi elds other than economics, particularly epidemiology, public health, 
sociology, psychology, and history. Different fi elds have different styles 
of presenting theory and evidence, as well as different standards for 
what counts as credible evidence. Nevertheless, the ideas are often 
important and should not be dismissed by economists, if only because 
they are widely accepted by many policy makers and by scholars in 
other disciplines, and economists need to confront, not ignore, them. In 
this spirit, it is worth presenting material that is not fully worked out 
theoretically nor convincingly demonstrated empirically. Economists 
can make important contributions to this work, and in turn are likely to 
benefi t from other social scientists’ sometimes well-argued skepticism 
of economists’ methodologies and prejudices.13
The limitations of our approaches not only apply to investigation, but 
also to policy. While public health researchers increasingly study what 
policies are effective, they do little to examine how policies are implemented 
and chosen by governments, or how they are avoided by some governments. 
Instead of continuing to propound dogmatically the need for intersectoral 
approaches, “bottom-up intervention” or “good governance”, public health 
must develop methods that are as well-defi ned as those used when performing 
epidemiological surveillance studies, which make it possible to implement 
effectively the policies that result from investigational work.
Markets and Healthcare: Learning the Wrong Lessons?
The role of market principles has expanded considerably in European 
health systems in recent decades. Yet all fall far short of the two groups of 
countries that have long relied extensively on market forces to provide 
health services, one by design, the other from a lack of resources. These 
groups are, respectively, the US and low-income countries. There are 
lessons to be learnt from their experience. They can be compared on four 
major dimensions of performance set out in the 2000 World Health Report 
on Health Systems: effi ciency, equity, quality and responsiveness.58
The US sy stem relies heavily on market elements such as ‘consumer 
choice’, managed care, and diagnosis-related groups. It often boasts of 
having the ‘best healthcare in the world’. Indeed, the US does have the best 
healthcare technology for those who can access it. After age 65, when 
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patients become eligible for Medicare (a universal health system for the 
elderly), cancer survival rates out perform Europe.59 Thus, that part of the 
American health system which is publicly funded, and at a signifi cantly 
higher level of funding than in Europe, does deliver high quality care. There 
are, alternatively, few positive things to say about health systems in low-
income countries. Medical care is ineffi cient, inequitable, of poor quality 
and generally unresponsive to patient and community needs. Costs of care 
are a leading cause of impoverishment, causing patients to routinely face a 
lethal dilemma: face bankruptcy or forego life.60 
Yet the worst features of this system apply not only to these low-income 
countries. In the US too, healthcare costs are a source of catastrophic 
expenditure, accounting for one out of every two bankruptcies. The US 
consistently lags behind Europe in amenable mortality42 and outcomes for 
those too young to receive Medicare coverage are signifi cantly worse than 
in Europe.61 It is also a clear outlier in terms of overall spending – spending 
the most, while getting the least. The WHO rankings, albeit contentious, 
put the US among the middle-income countries in terms of health system 
equity.58 Furthermore, several poor communities in America experience 
higher rates of infectious disease, psychosis and premature births than in 
developing countries.17,62
These results are not surprising. In a seminal paper from 1963, the 
Nobel Laureate economist Kenneth Arrow had demonstrated that free 
markets do not work for healthcare because the need for medical treatments 
and services is unpredictable (requiring insurance systems) while at the 
same time, informed and rational individuals face diffi culties in making 
decisions in their own best interests, instead requiring expert advice 
(preventing experiential comparison shopping for prices of services of the 
same quality).63 As stated by another Nobel Laureate economist Paul 
Krugman, “There are no examples of successful healthcare based on the 
principles of the free market.”64
Remarkably, despite the notable limitations of market-based models in 
the US and in poor countries, European policymakers often look to the US 
for inspiration. This is, in part, a refl ection of its acknowledged leadership 
in important public health arenas such as health promotion but also the neo-
liberal agenda of the 1980s that sought to reduce the role of the state to 
provide space for private-sector expansion and the partial privatisation of 
health systems. This is most apparent in the UK, perhaps because of its 
claim to a “special relationship” with the US. For politicians, there is 
pressure to ‘do something’ – sins of commission. Almost every country has 
its discontents with its health system, seeing that the ‘grass is greener’ 
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elsewhere. This leads some policymakers to pursue short-term political 
strategies which may bring some immediate benefi ts but compromise the 
long-term development of the health system. 
Thus far, the results of this process have been mixed. European countries 
started at different points in their mix of public/private fi nance and delivery, 
but by adopting greater market components, show some signs of convergence 
with each other and the US. One example has been the growing use of 
public-private contracts, designed to boost the effi ciency of care delivery 
and contain rising costs. In the UK, for example, the additional capacity for 
elective surgery has decreased patient waiting times, even if at much greater 
cost than would have been incurred by expanding public provision (to the 
extent that this can be assessed given England’s Department of Health’s 
exclusion of these fi nancial arrangements from freedom of information 
legislation, citing commercial confi dentiality).
In many cases, however, market-based mechanisms have backfi red. One 
example is the UK’s Private Finance Initiative, developed as a means of 
raising capital for building hospitals and healthcare infrastructure, taking 
advantage of accounting rules that would keep the sums involved outside 
the offi cial Public Sector Borrowing Requirement.65 The idea was that 
private companies would advance money and be repaid by the government 
over a long-term period. In hindsight, this was a mistake. It was a short-term 
political decision, pushing the high costs of fi nancing new hospitals (of 
questionable necessity) onto future generations. Some countries have now 
reversed course. For example, Australia harnessed in these growing long-
term liabilities by buying back the privately fi nanced hospitals, instead of 
paying off the interest on its high and outstanding hospital debts.66 In the 
UK, these debts have been, in real terms, compounded by the recent fi nancial 
crisis. Even though interest rates fell to 1 percent, the government was 
locked into paying back private companies at much greater rates of over 4 
percent, a situation similar to the decades of debt obligations that have 
resulted in underinvestment in the health systems of low-income countries.
Market mechanisms can play a role in healthcare, and there are 
some successes. For example, incentive payments introduced for general 
practitioners in the UK meant to improve the quality of primary care have 
reduced inequalities. However, the cumulative evidence shows that market 
mechanisms are no panacea for reducing health service costs or improving 
quality, fairness or responsiveness to patient needs. If Europe wishes to 
maintain its existing commitment to solidarity, decision makers ought to be 
far more critical of unproven strategies to shift health service planning from 
228 Public Health Reviews, Vol. 32, No 1
need to demand, turning patients into consumers, and transforming health 
into a private market good. 
POLITICAL CHOICES AND HEALTH CONSEQUENCES: 
THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE WIDENING EAST-WEST 
HEALTH GAP
In setting out to build capitalism out of socialism’s ruins, policymakers 
faced uncharted territory: How to proceed? While countries had moved 
from capitalism to socialism, few had experience with shifting in the other 
direction, with the notable exception of China. Many Soviet politicians 
(and many in the West) wished to seize the opportunity of the 1989 
disintegration of the Soviet bloc to enable the socialist countries to make 
the leap to capitalism in one jump. There were fears that, if they did not, the 
Communists would return to power.
The debate centred on what was the appropriate pace of transformation. 
One side of the debate argued for a policy platform, referred to as “Shock 
Therapy”, which called for the rapid privatisation, liberalisation and 
stabilisation of Communist institutions. As one western advisor fi ercely 
argued, “The need to accelerate privatisation is the paramount economic 
policy issue facing Eastern Europe. If there is no breakthrough in the 
privatisation of large enterprises in the near future, the entire process could be 
stalled for years to come. Privatisation is urgent and politically vulnerable.”67 
As the World Bank’s head of mass privatisation implementation wrote, 
“There was a concern by Russian reformers, above all, that the Communist 
Party might soon take control again; their desire, therefore was to move as 
rapidly as possible, i.e., to create ‘facts on the ground’ that made a market 
economy irreversible.”68 Although the logic was mainly political, there was 
remarkable consensus among economists. As Lawrence Summers put it, 
“Despite economists’ reputation for never being able to agree on anything, 
there is a striking degree of unanimity in the advice that has been provided to 
the nations of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The legions of 
economists who have descended on the formerly communist economies have 
provided advice very similar…the three ‘ations’ – privatisation, stabilisation, 
and liberalisation – must all be completed as soon as possible.”69
Yet there was real dispute. Some economists and politicians, such as 
Joseph Stiglitz and Mikhail Gorbachev, called for a more gradual approach, 
like that being pursued in China. Markets would be allowed to evolve 
gradually to replace underperforming state institutions – “growing out of 
the plan.”70
Public Health in Europe 229
While some of the proposed Shock Therapy reforms, including 
liberalisation and stabilisation, had been implemented rapidly in Latin 
American and East Asian countries, the privatisation of an entire economy 
in a short period was unprecedented. The political logic was arguably the 
most compelling. “Privatisation, above all, is a highly political decision – 
that private ownership matters and that a capitalist model would serve the 
populations better than socialism.”68 As another fi nancial planner noted at 
the beginning of reform, ‘‘There was a period when politics as usual was 
largely suspended, as one had to be bold.’’71
For those in power, the programmes also created an opportunity for 
the  former nomenklatura, the ruling class of communists, to reinvent 
themselves as capitalists. These programmes enabled them to use their 
insider networks to gain access to capital and fi rms at bargain prices. In one 
of the most heinous schemes, the loans-for-shares programme, bidding for 
a company with oil assets valued in the billions opened at $100 million 
USD and closed at $101 million USD. It is policies such as these which 
created the famed Russian oligarchs and led to an unprecedented rise in 
both Russia’s billionaire index and Gini coeffi cient.*5
How would health be affected? These programmes were expected to 
have at least two major impacts on health: fi rst by increasing job insecurity 
and job losses, with their known consequences for health, and second, by 
dismantling the Soviet-era cradle-to-grave welfare system at a time when 
people were suffering the most. As Noreena Hertz, at the time working for 
the World Bank as an economist overseeing mass privatisation in the Russian 
Federation, explained:
 “... the famous economists advising the Russians, including my bosses, 
acted as if they had a clear blueprint in their pocket. Privatize, open up 
your markets, slash your public expenditure and you will become a 
refl ection of America was their policy advice.... Of course anyone who 
had spent any signifi cant length of time in Russia would have realized 
not only how unrealistic this advice was but also would have become 
increasingly concerned about the costs that these steps would impose. 
With the specifi c task of working on developing the Russian privatization 
program I soon recognized both. What would happen I asked my 
Washington bosses when under unbearable fi nancial pressure the 
* Gini coeffi cient: An economic measure of inequality of income distribution of income/wealth 
at a particular point in time, used to compare changes in income distribution within a country 
or between countries. The index varies between 0 and 1.0; and 1 indicates complete inequality. 
[URL: http://go.worldbank.org/3SLYUTVY00 (11April, 2010).]
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factories I was spending time in had to lay off thousands of their 
employees? What would happen to the healthcare, the schools, the 
sanatoriums that these factories were providing? Not just to their workers 
but to the entire locality when there were no social safety nets in place? 
‘Don’t worry about all that’ I was told, ‘the market will sort it out’.”71
As one Worl d Bank economist put it, “The central premise is that before 
long-run gains in health status are realised, the transition towards a market 
economy and adoption of democratic forms of government should lead 
to  short-run deterioration.”72 While the effects of the Shock Therapy 
programmes on the economy are still being debated,73-76 their impacts on 
healthcare and health are relatively clear.11,77 In former Soviet c ountries, 
there was an attempt to move everything to the market quickly after the fall 
of the Soviet Union, emulating a low-income country model.78 Although 
Soviet pr inciples of universal care were retained, costs were shifted onto 
patients; care ceased to be guaranteed at the point of service and instead 
became almost entirely funded from out-of-pocket expenditures. One expert 
described the changes as “tortuous, problematic, and confusing”, noting 
further that, “as a general rule, these reforms have not been effective...[and] 
the failures of such reforms have contributed to health problems in the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.”79 Another put it, “The market was 
perceived as a panacea for resource shortages and the other ills of the system. 
It has not proved to be so....”78 The consequences were soon apparent. The 
Soviet system had never managed to adapt to the epidemiological challenges 
emerging in the second half of the 20th century,80 but the speed of change 
overwhelmed it. There were increasing deaths that should be amenable to 
healthcare (including a 300 percent rise in deaths from diabetes among 
persons between ages 15 and 49),37 rises in out-of-pocket payments, and 
growing barriers to healthcare access (especially among the poor).81,82 
However, the greater impact of rapid free-market reforms on health 
resulted from triggering a rise in psychosocial stress (specifi cally, what 
Durkheim had described as anomie), unemployment and hazardous 
drinking.83-87 Attempts to priv atise the entire economy within a two-year 
timeline delivered a major shock to society – increasing unemployment and 
job insecurity (both in state-owned fi rms and privatised fi rms), led to capital 
fl ight, and undermined social safety nets.11 Unstable employment led to 
much higher risks of death85 than was seen with unemployment in Western 
European countries.88,89 At the same time, hazardous drinking, in part driven 
by reductions in prices and increased supply, especially of a variety of very 
strong alcohol products such as aftershaves, gave desperate people an easy 
means of their own self-destruction.86,90 
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One comparison puts the effects of the contrasting approaches in 
perspective. Western advisors chided Russia’s neighbour, Belarus, for its 
slow pace of privatisation (10 percent of fi rms by 1996), calling it a “Soviet 
theme park.” However, while mortality trends in Belarus and Russia had 
been very similar since the 1960s, only in the early 1990s did the overall 
all-cause mortality rate begin to diverge (Figure 3). Russia’s age-standardised 
mortality rate rose more than 40 percent, while Belarus continued on its 
slow deterioration, increasing steadily by about 10 percent. This pattern 
was observed throughout the post-Soviet region: more rapid reformers 
experienced greater rises in all-cause working-age male mortality rates,11 as 
well as alcohol-related death rates, suicide rates and ischaemic heart disease 
death rates.91
Fig. 3. Mass Privatisation and Adult Male Mortality Rates in Belarus and Russia.
Notes: Age-standardised mortality rates are from the UNICEF TransMonee Database, 2005 edition. 
Russian state-owned enterprise privatisation data are from the 1997 Russian Economic Trends report 
version, and Belarus state-owned enterprise privatisation data are from the World Bank 1997 Belarus 
Country Economic Memorandum. These data are available at the World Bank statistical yearbook 
(1998): http://www.worldbank.org/ecspf/PSDYearbook/XLS/. See EBRD transition report series for 
similar estimates.
Source: Stuckler et al.11 Available from URL: http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/
PIIS0140-6736(09)60005-2/fulltext# (Accessed 14 April, 2010).
There were also long-term health consequences of rapid privatisation. 
Through pressure from Western advisors, especially the IMF,22,77 the Soviet 
tobacco and alcohol monopolies were privatised. This enabled industries 
to  circumvent taxation and regulations,92,93 and ultimately deliver more 
effi cient drugs to the population, at a time when stress levels were 
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exceedingly high.94 The devastating health consequences of the post-Soviet 
crisis are even more troubling when compared with other major economic 
crises, such as the Great Depression. In both cases, gross domestic product 
(GDP) dropped by about 30 percent. However, in the Great Depression, 
all-cause mortality rates dropped by about 10 percent, while in the Post-
Communist Depression, they rose by about 20 percent. Yet the US of the 
1920s and 1930s was very different from the former Soviet Union in the 
1990s, in two important respects. First, in 1919 the US had introduced 
prohibition against alcohol, and while alcohol could still be obtained, it was 
much more diffi cult to do so. Second, President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
implemented the New Deal, a government program that created jobs and 
provided important social safety nets, notably the Social Security Act of 
1935.95 The available evidence suggests that economic downturns have 
mixed effects on health, tending to increase suicides and reduce road traffi c 
fatalities, but that, overall, the health risks depend crucially on the extent to 
which governments control risks such as alcohol and maintain employment, 
social and health security.96
It is unrealistic to believe that public health advocacy could have avoided 
the appalling effects of rapid transition in the post-Soviet region. However, 
had Health Impact Assessment97 been an institutionalised and independent 
component of the economic policies pursued by the international fi nancial 
agencies during this period, there would at least have been a voice calling for 
caution, pointing to the likely human toll and so providing some counterbalance 
to the vociferous campaigners in favour of Shock Therapy. Whenever 
politicians seek short-term fi xes, urging radical economic reforms, public 
health must identify potential negative health effects, strategies for mitigating 
them, and, where possible, demonstrate the strength of the evidence behind 
these decisions (even if that evidence lies outside public health). The 
ongoing consequences to European public health are clear: today’s 
persistent East-West EU health gap is a legacy of these political decisions.
TOWARDS A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HEALTH IN EUROPE
“Medicine is a social science, and politics nothing
but medicine at a larger scale.”
Rudolph Virchow,98 1848
Today, Virchow’s statement might also read in reverse: “Social science is 
medicine, and medicine is nothing but politics at a larger scale.” The 
practice of medicine cannot be apolitical; nor can politics be separated 
from its impacts on health.
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Nearly all of the remaining challenges to the health of Europeans do not 
derive from a lack of evidence. Instead, they relate to a narrow set of 
economic and political decisions, benefi ting the few over the many. Therein 
lies the key challenge to European public health: how to confront threats 
from political and economic decisions. Public health is, intrinsically, about 
making the invisible visible. It can do much by drawing attention to the 
complex paths from political and economic decisions and the health of 
nations; studying the immediate causes of disease alone is insuffi cient and, 
arguably, counter-productive from a political economy perspective. 
If an explicit goal of European public health is to narrow growing health 
inequalities, thus achieving ‘Health for All’, the individual focus of public 
health will not be enough. Behind social inequalities are people, in positions 
of infl uence, making decisions that reduce or perpetuate inequalities. How 
should we infl uence these macroeconomic and social decisions that 
profoundly affect health and healthcare? As Geoffrey Rose famously noted 
in a different context, if we wish to address European public health, we 
must ask why some populations are healthy and others sick.99 Public health 
has not risen to this challenge. 
These failures come into focus in light of the challenges posed by 
certain policy nexuses, such as obesity and the Common Agricultural 
Policy; tobacco and the World Trade Organization; and medicines and the 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement. These 
are the “causes of the causes of the causes”. Important steps have been 
taken to begin to address them by a few research groups, but they remain a 
minority in public health and medicine.
Similarly, public health has long recognised the need to address social 
determinants of health, but public health rarely engages with those who 
drive these determinants. These include the IMF, the World Bank (beyond 
its Health, Nutrition and Population division), the World Trade Organization, 
and representatives of fi nance and trade ministries. One school of health 
policy analysis is simple: ask who benefi ts? And who loses? Follow the 
money, and we will fi nd the root cause of many of our most intractable 
problems. Public health must engage with powerful international fi nancial 
institutions as the key means of interaction with the powerful corporate and 
political interests that they represent, but it must do so within a clear set of 
rules of engagement, based on explicit principles, including transparency. 
As public health reaches its crossroads, it must decide which path to 
take. It has reached the end of the road travelled thus far. The report of the 
WHO Commission on the Social Determinants of Health acknowledges the 
tension between the status quo of economic policy and maximising the best 
234 Public Health Reviews, Vol. 32, No 1
possible public health.31 Yet one road ahead, putting politics and power 
back in analysis, is not new at all. It dates to the early and mid19th century, 
when progress was made in sanitation, nutrition and in eliminating poverty, 
bringing about reductions in tuberculosis at a time before antibiotics had 
been discovered and in mortality from measles before a vaccine had been 
developed. Today we stand at the opposite end of the spectrum. We have 
pushed medicine close to its limits but are achieving diminishing returns 
from the dominant economic development model, as well as medicine 
itself. We have medical knowledge but lack the imagination that, in the 
past, had achieved remarkable progress when technology had little to offer. 
This may seem radical, but to do otherwise is a riskier strategy, as it 
allows the public health fi eld to reproduce existing imbalances in power 
without developing the means to address the challenges that lie ahead. As 
we enter the third stage of epidemiologic transition, to ‘man-made’ 
degenerative diseases, the challenge of combating NCDs and promoting 
healthy ageing require not only medical technology and public health 
interventions but also actions that address social conditions. Only when 
power and politics are at the front of analysis and action, when the needs of 
the many are principled over the desires of the few, can we break through 
the ‘glass ceiling’ of stagnating progress in European public health.
Often papers such as this conclude with recommendations that persons 
outside public health should take. Instead, we hold a mirror up to ourselves 
as public health professionals. We recommend the following steps that 
should be taken within public health, given the lessons from European 
policy-making in the last half century:
1.  We should begin all public health analysis by thinking about who 
benefi ts and who loses from the results of a study as well as the decision 
to implement or not to implement a policy.
2.  We should identify our intellectual predispositions as part of our studies. 
Researchers are only human; they develop hypotheses based on their 
intrinsic values, attempt to reach a fi nding that confi rms this, and then 
write up the paper once they fi nd consistent results. Rarely, this can lead 
to serious abuse, as has been seen in the behaviour of certain researchers 
of climate change at the University of East Anglia. The very least that 
should be done is to make this explicit. 
3.  The two previous steps should form part of expanded confl ict of interest 
statements.
4.  The incentive structure embedded in the system of promotion in 
academic medicine and public health should be refocused to encourage 
research and scholarship that addresses some of the fundamental 
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questions about the distribution of power in society and the relationships 
between the individual and the state. Mechanisms are needed that 
reward those whose ideas are innovative yet risky, rather than low risk 
and predictable, a task that will challenge the inherent conservatism of 
many reviewers and grant-awarding bodies. In this respect, the National 
Institute of Health’s Pioneer awards to encourage innovative, high-risk 
ideas100 and the recent decision by the Wellcome Trust101 to fund 
individuals rather than projects offer considerable promise. 
5.  We must explicitly identify the political mechanisms and study the 
political processes that determine key public health policies–evaluating, 
at each step, what decisions were made based on which evidence (or 
lack thereof), and who participated in the decision-making, as well as 
how the public health evidence weighs in on different aspects of the 
decision.
6.  Health Impact Assessment must be integrated into the decisions that are 
directed by Ministries of Finance, urging public health practitioners to 
engage actively with these Ministries as well as with the non-governmental 
organisations that monitor government action and advocate for change. 
However, this must incorporate openly debated principles and avoid 
capture by powerful vested interests. 
7.  Public health practitioners, teachers, and researchers should be forceful 
advocates for advancing effective public health and social policies 
within the political environments in which they live to advance the 
health of the population they serve.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The examples discussed in this paper show why public health professionals 
must engage with the political factors that shape the world in which they 
work, seeking to understand the dominant paradigms, how they have been 
defi ned and shaped, and how they might be changed. Their effects are 
often subtle but powerful, shaping the language that is used, the assumptions 
that are made, and the rules that are implied. This can be seen in the
focus on individual risk factors that diverts attention from their underlying 
determinants, the dominance of the market in healthcare, and the 
presumption in favour of a rapid transition from communism in the 1990s.
Fundamentally, it demands that we continue to seek and expand our 
search for the causes of disease, and applying the best standards of 
preventing them, but we should also ask what it is about society that allows 
those causes to exist and to exert their effects and, ultimately, how they 
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might be changed. Progress on the key challenges facing European public 
health also depends on the extent to which the European public health 
community can engage with the political economy of the world it inhabits.
Confl icts of interest: None declared.
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